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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 A federal statute, Immigration and Nationality Act 
(―INA‖) § 241(b)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), 
precludes withholding of removal if ―there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of 
the United States.‖  In November 2003, the Government of 
Uzbekistan requested the extradition of, inter alia, Petitioners 
Bekhzod Yusupov and Ismoil Samadov (collectively 
―Petitioners‖), asserting they participated with others in a 
movement seeking the ―forced overthrow‖ of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, and the establishment on its territory of a 
―religious extremist Islamic fundamental state.‖  Y.App. at 
705, S.App. at 2993.
1
  After hearing testimony that it was 
merely pretext for persecution, both Immigration Judges 
(―IJs‖) concluded that the extradition request would be given 
no weight, ―coming from a government such as this with a 
history of engaging in persecution and using torture as a 
sovereign tool.‖  In Re Yusupov, No. A 79-729-905, at 10 (IJ  
Dec. Nov. 19, 2004).  In addition, Uzbekistan stimulated 
Interpol notices seeking assistance in locating Petitioners.  
The Government now asserts that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe both Petitioners are a danger to the 
security of the United States. 
 
 These consolidated cases were previously before this 
court.  In Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 201 (3d Cir. 
2008) (―Yusupov I‖), this court overruled the Attorney 
General‘s construction of the national security exception that 
required merely that a person ―may‖ pose a danger to our 
security and held that the provision only applies to an 
                                              
1
  Each Petitioner filed a separate Appendix.  We refer 
to that filed by Yusupov as ―Y.App.‖ and filed by 
Samadov as ―S.App.‖  The appendix located at the back of 
Yusupov‘s opening brief will be referred to as 
―Y.Br.App.‖ 
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individual who actually ―is‖ a danger.  Because the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (―BIA‖) evaluated Petitioners‘ cases 
under the incorrect standard, this court remanded to the BIA 
without passing on the merits.  On remand, the BIA found 
that Petitioners are a danger to national security and are thus 
ineligible for withholding of removal.  The BIA, however, 
granted the Petitioners deferral of removal under the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture (―CAT‖) finding it more 
likely than not that Petitioners would be persecuted and 
tortured on account of their religion and political opinion if 
returned to Uzbekistan.  We are now called on to consider 
whether substantial evidence supports the BIA‘s 
determination that Petitioners pose an actual, present danger 
to the security of the United States.
2
   
 
I. 
 
Background 
 
A.  Factual Overview 
 
Yusupov and Samadov are two nationals of 
Uzbekistan who claim to be Independent Muslims and 
followers of Imam Obidkhon Nazarov.  Nazarov and his 
followers have been subject to persecution since the early 
1990s by the Uzbek Government, known for its silencing of 
dissent and its ―very poor‖ human rights track record, charges 
also maintained by the U.S. Government.  S.App. at 2170-73, 
Y.App. at 108.  Petitioners left Uzbekistan in 1999, allegedly 
to pursue educational opportunities in the United States, and 
are now unwilling to return for fear of persecution.    
 
Yusupov and Samadov both testified at their respective 
initial hearings that they had only peacefully attended their 
mosques in their homeland and had engaged in no violent or 
                                              
2
 This court expresses its gratitude to Amici Curiae – 
Columbia Law School‘s Human Rights Institute; the 
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund et. al. 
(―AALDEF‖) and Immigration Law Scholars – for their 
submissions. 
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subversive activity.  Both reported that in 2001, after they 
were in the United States, a former roommate, surname 
Oripjanov, was tortured and interrogated in Uzbekistan and 
forced to sign false allegations against them.  This, they 
testified, precipitated Uzbekistan‘s issuance of the extradition 
requests and Interpol warrants charging them with 
participating in activities in support of an illegal, religious, 
extremist movement.  The IJ presiding at Yusupov‘s hearing 
concluded that ―after listening closely to his testimony, and 
examining the voluminous evidence of record, [he] found 
respondent to have testified credibly.‖  In re Yusupov, No. A 
79-729-905, at 9 (IJ Dec. Nov. 19, 2004).  After hearing this 
testimony, Samadov‘s IJ similarly concluded as follows: 
 
The Court has carefully reviewed that 
extradition request.  It does not charge 
the respondent with any specific 
incident. . . .  It appears that the 
respondent is being sought by the 
government of Uzbekistan because of his 
religious beliefs. 
 
Based upon the documentary 
evidence that has been provided in this 
case, the reports of the State Department, 
about the religious Freedom Report and 
the Human Rights Report, the report 
from Human Rights Watch, the other 
corroborating evidence, the Court finds 
that the respondent‘s testimony when 
placed against this evidence is extremely 
credible.  
 
S.App. at 46. 
 
Neither of these findings regarding the credibility of 
Petitioners has subsequently been withdrawn by the IJ or 
found by the BIA to be clearly erroneous.
3
  Indeed, the BIA 
                                              
3
 As noted hereafter, see infra text at 8, Samadov‘s IJ 
found some of his testimony at a subsequent hearing to be 
6 
 
on review, expressly found ―no clear error in [Yusupov‘s] 
Immigration Judge‘s credibility determination regarding . . . 
the Uzbek extradition request and INTERPOL warrant.‖  In 
Re Yusupov, No. 79-729-905, at 3 (BIA Dec. June 18, 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, in 2002, after receiving notice of criminal 
charges against Petitioners in Uzbekistan, the United States 
initiated an investigation during which Petitioners consented 
to a search of their shared home and computer.  The search 
revealed cached video clips of Osama bin Laden and an 
alleged Chechen militant and what appear to be attacks on 
Russian troops and vehicles, a map of Pennsylvania State 
Police facilities, and an email addressed to Petitioners‘ former 
roommate, Erkinjon Zakirov, also an Uzbek national, that 
references ―jihad.‖4  See Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 190-92.  
                                                                                                     
―not credible.‖  However, this testimony related solely to 
Samadov‘s residence and activities after coming to this 
country.  She did not retreat from her prior findings 
regarding the extradition request, the warrant, and 
Samadov‘s activities abroad.  S.App. at 23-28.  To the 
contrary, at this subsequent stage, the IJ relied upon the 
same ―documentary evidence‖ regarding Uzbekistan‘s 
treatment of Independent Muslims in support of her 
conclusion that Samadov would be tortured upon his 
return to his home country. 
 
4
 The email reads: 
 
In the name of God.  
Peace upon you.  
Abu Ismoil, my brother 
 
In my letter to PAHKAN I asked him questions 
you wanted me to.  
1- It is a possibility for You in particular and 
Otabek to get out from there, but it will require 
from us a lot of enormous amount of hard work 
with lots of difficulties. Therefore, if you can, 
please stay there, you will be serving Islam a 
7 
 
The Government initiated removal proceedings against 
Petitioners.  Petitioners conceded removability and applied 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. 
 
In March 2004, IJ Grace A. Sease granted Samadov‘s 
application for withholding of removal under the INA.
5
  
S.App. at 46.  The BIA affirmed.  Later that year, the 
Government moved to reopen Samadov‘s case on the ground 
                                                                                                     
big favor, your stay there will be a great jihad in 
the name of God.  
2- [PAKHAN] said that Abdu Wali Qorakan‘s 
classes on how to bring the Muslim religion 
into Uzbekistan will happen.  You will be 
meeting him and taking instructions directly 
from him. 
3- Regarding the boy you mentioned.  (The idea 
is good to save the boy from the [National 
Security Council of Uzbekistan] but this 
requires a large amount of money, [PAKHAN] 
suggested not to pay the money before the boy 
is out, otherwise the prices will keep going up 
and all will be wasted. 
 
Ask for patience from God. Be patient, you are 
on a great path, the jihad in the name of God.  
DO NOT FORGET TO GET MARRIED!!! 
Please hurry!!! All will be fine, with God‘s 
blessing!!  
God will keep you safe.  
As you see, we have many difficulties.  
Sincerely yours, brother: 
Abu Ibroiym 
 
S.App. at 1073. 
 
5
 See INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) 
(statutory withholding of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) 
(withholding of removal under the Convention Against 
Torture).    
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that it had obtained new, previously unavailable evidence, 
namely the files extracted from the shared computer, that 
supported a finding that he was a danger to the security of the 
United States.
6
   
 
At the reopened hearing, the Government presented 
testimony only of Mark Olexa, an agent of the Department of 
Homeland Security (―DHS‖) Joint Terrorism Task Force 
working out of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Agent Olexa was 
unable to translate the non-English writing superimposed on 
one of the videoclips or provide additional detail regarding 
the contents of several of the videos due to his lack of 
familiarity with the language.
7
  S.App. at 393-414.  Olexa 
never interviewed Samadov about the materials or other 
evidence, and did not identify who had downloaded the files 
to the shared computer.  He based his opinion that Samadov 
had engaged in ―extremist activity‖ primarily on the 
allegations in the extradition request.  S.App. at 408.  After 
the hearing, IJ Sease found Samadov‘s testimony regarding 
the computer and his activities in this country to be ―not 
credible.‖  Although the IJ held that he was ineligible for 
withholding of removal as a danger to national security, she 
found Samadov eligible for deferral under the CAT.  In re 
Samadov, A 79-729-711, at 14-15 (IJ Dec. Aug. 2, 2005).  In 
May 2006, the BIA affirmed.    
 
In November 2004, in separate proceedings, IJ Walter 
A. Durling, who was presiding at Yusupov‘s hearing, found 
him to be credible and held that there were not reasonable 
                                              
6
 The FBI seized the computer in June 2002, but the 
Government took almost two years to fully sort and 
translate the materials.  Because Yusupov‘s hearing was 
held after that of Samadov‘s first hearing, the computer 
materials were presented to the immigration court in 
Yusupov‘s case in the first instance. 
 
7
 In presenting his testimony, he relied on information 
provided by ―someone familiar with the Russian 
language‖ and other FBI agents.  S.App. at 402.   
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grounds to believe he is a danger to national security.  The IJ 
granted Yusupov‘s applications for withholding of removal 
and CAT relief.
8
  The IJ found it significant that the 
Government ―did not produce any writing or correspondence 
pertaining to [Yusupov] that suggests any violent intentions 
or proclivities, nor has [it] suggested his collaboration or 
friendship with anyone in the United States considered of 
violent repute.‖  In re Yusupov, No. A 79-729-905, at 6 (IJ 
Dec. Nov. 19, 2004).   
 
IJ Durling noted the Government‘s argument that its 
threshold for establishing a reason to believe an alien is a 
danger is ―low.‖  Id. at 8.  IJ Durling stated that even 
accepting that argument, this ―requires at least a modicum of 
evidence,‖ and ―some nexus between an alien‘s presence in 
the United States and his activities or beliefs which quantify 
him as a security risk,‖ which the Government failed to 
provide.  Id.  The IJ afforded the politically motivated 
extradition request no weight with regard to the allegations of 
criminal misconduct.  Id. at 10.  In August 2005, the BIA 
reversed the IJ‘s grant of withholding of removal on national 
security grounds but upheld the grant of deferral of removal 
for Yusupov under the CAT.   
 
Yusupov and Samadov petitioned for review and this 
court consolidated the petitions.    
 
B.  Third Circuit Remand 
 
 In Yusupov I, this court did not comment regarding the 
sufficiency of the evidence as to whether either Petitioner 
falls within the national security exception.  Rather, we 
limited our decision to an interpretation of the statutory 
language that provides withholding of removal is unavailable 
if ―there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a 
danger to the security of the United States.‖  INA § 
241(b)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv).  We deferred 
to the Attorney General‘s interpretation that reasonable 
                                              
8
 The Government also presented Agent Olexa as a 
witness at Yusupov‘s hearing.    
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grounds to believe is satisfied ―if there is information that 
would permit a reasonable person to believe,‖ a standard akin 
to probable cause in criminal cases.  Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 
200.  In addition, we found that the Attorney General was 
reasonable to interpret the exception as allowing the 
consideration of any evidence that is ―not intrinsically 
suspect,‖ including evidence that would not be admissible 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id. (internal quotation 
omitted).   
 
However, as relevant here, we overruled the Attorney 
General‘s reading of the statutory phrase ―is a danger‖ as 
requiring merely that an alien ―may pose‖ a danger.  Id. at 
201.  Instead, we held that the provision applies only to 
individuals who ―actually‖ pose a danger, reasoning that the 
term ―is‖ simply ―does not mean ‗may.‘‖  Id.  We refrained 
from determining the ―contours of risk to our Nation‘s 
defense, foreign relations, or economic interests‖ that would 
pose the requisite danger, deferring to the Attorney General‘s 
interpretation that the danger must be ―nontrivial.‖  Id.  We 
found the standard ―includes an inherent seriousness 
requirement.‖  Id. at 204 (noting that ―the Attorney General 
was not unreasonable . . . to ensure that immigration judges 
do not consider trivial dangers in applying the national 
security exception‖).  This court remanded to the BIA for 
application of the correct standard.   
 
C.  BIA on Remand 
 
 1. Yusupov  
 
On remand, the BIA again reversed the decision of IJ 
Durling granting Yusupov withholding of removal and 
finding that Yusupov was not a danger to the security of the 
United States.  In so doing, the BIA engaged in de novo 
review because it concluded that such a determination 
―concerns an issue of fact and law.‖  In re Yusupov, No. A 
79-729-905, at 2 (BIA Dec. June 18, 2009) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(d)(3)(ii) and Matter of V-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 500 
(BIA 2008)).  Although the BIA found ―no clear error in the 
[IJ]‘s credibility determination regarding [Yusupov‘s] 
11 
 
explanations of the reasons for downloading files on his 
computer, or the potential that the Uzbek extradition request 
and INTERPOL warrant are politically motivated,‖ it 
nonetheless determined that ―[t]here is considerable evidence 
to support the [Government‘s] claim that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that [Yusupov] presents an actual danger 
to national security.‖  Id. at 2-3.   
 
The BIA relied on the following evidence to support 
its determination: (1) the extradition request; (2) the Interpol 
warrant; (3) cached video clips found on the shared computer; 
(4) the email sent to Zakirov, a sometime roommate of 
Petitioners, referring to his ―role‖ in a ―big jihad;‖ (5) a 
publicly available Pennsylvania Police facilities map from the 
shared computer; (6) entry by Yusupov, Samadov, and their 
roommate Zakirov to the United States on student visas, none 
of whom attended school for any length of time; (7) 
Yusupov‘s 2003 misdemeanor conviction for representing 
himself as a United States citizen on a job application; and (8) 
Yusupov‘s attempt to ―evade detention‖ upon learning that 
the federal government sought to apprehend his roommates 
and his initial failure to provide his residence to investigators.  
Id.  The BIA, however, upheld the IJ‘s decision granting 
Yusupov CAT deferral, finding it is more likely than not that 
he would be tortured if returned.      
 
One member of the BIA panel dissented in a brief 
footnote, stating:  
 
On further reflection, Board Member Filppu 
finds the favorable credibility assessement [sic] 
below significant, and thus respectfully 
dissents.  The Immigration Judge was not 
clearly erroneous in crediting [Yusupov‘s] 
innocent explanations for what would 
otherwise be reasonable concerns respecting 
his danger to the United States.  Accepting 
those explanations as true, in the context of this 
case, supports the ruling below, and [the 
Government‘s] appeal should be dismissed. 
 
12 
 
Id. at 5.    
 
2. Samadov  
 
On remand, the BIA again upheld the 2005 decision of 
IJ Sease denying Samadov withholding of removal as a 
danger to the security of the United States.  In so doing, the 
BIA upheld the IJ‘s adverse credibility determination and 
found that ―[t]here is considerable evidence to support the 
[Government‘s] claims that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that [Samadov] presents an actual danger to national 
security.‖  In re Samadov, No. A 79-729-711, at 2 (BIA Dec. 
June 18, 2009). 
 
The BIA relied on the following evidence similar to 
that it considered in connection with Yusupov‘s appeal to 
support its determination: (1) the extradition request; (2) the 
Interpol warrant; (3) the video files; (4) the ―jihad‖ email;9 (5) 
the Pennsylvania Police facilities map; (6) entry by Samadov 
and Zakirov to the United States on student visas, neither of 
whom attended school for any length of time; (7) the attempt 
to evade detention by Samadov‘s former roommates, 
Yusupov and Zakirov; and (8) Samadov‘s conflicting 
testimony regarding whether he had ―given and received 
thousands of dollars from groups or individuals‖ in Central 
Asia.  Id. at 2-3.  The BIA here too upheld the IJ‘s decision 
granting Samadov CAT deferral because it is more likely than 
not he would be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan.    
 
Yusupov and Samadov timely appeal.  
 
II. 
 
Jurisdiction and Standards of Review 
                                              
9
 The Government initially argued that this email had 
been sent to Samadov, but it became clear during the 
reopened proceedings that the email was addressed to 
Zakirov.  Indeed, the IJ questioned whether the 
Government would have successfully reopened the case 
based on the other materials alone.  S.App. at 463-64. 
13 
 
  
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA‘s final orders 
of removal under INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  
See also Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 195-96.  We review de novo 
constitutional claims or questions of law and the application 
of law to facts with appropriate agency deference.  INA § 
242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Yusupov I, 518 F.3d 
at 197.  We uphold the BIA‘s factual determinations if they 
are ―supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole.‖  Li v. Att’y 
Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation 
omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (―administrative 
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary‖).  
We review the IJ‘s findings under this same substantial 
evidence standard to the extent ―the BIA directs us to the 
opinion and decision of the IJ who originally assessed [the] 
application.‖  Shah v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 
2006) (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).  
 
III. 
 
Analysis 
 
A.  Forms of Relief 
 
We begin our analysis with a brief discussion of the 
forms of relief at issue in this petition.  Yusupov and 
Samadov were both granted deferral of removal under the 
CAT.  Petitioners bring this appeal in part to afford them 
withholding of removal, under the INA and the CAT, which 
they argue provides superior procedural and substantive 
rights.
10
    
                                              
10
 Yusupov concedes that he is ineligible for asylum 
for his failure to file an application within one year of his 
entry.  Although Samadov correctly states that the BIA in 
its most recent decision did not consider his claim that his 
asylum application was timely, in its first decision the 
BIA specifically affirmed the IJ‘s denial of asylum for 
failure to file within one year of arrival.  This court lacks 
14 
 
Consistent with our nonrefoulement obligations under 
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, section 241(b)(3)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(A), prohibits removal of an individual unlawfully 
in this country if the Attorney General believes that the 
individual‘s life or freedom would be threatened in the 
country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion 
(statutory withholding of removal).
11
  Credible testimony 
alone may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without 
further corroboration.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).  In addition, the 
CAT, as codified in regulation, provides for withholding of 
removal if it is more likely than not that an individual would 
be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.  8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c).   
 
Withholding of removal under both the INA and the 
CAT is precluded if ―there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.‖  
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2).  ―If 
the evidence indicates the applicability of [the national 
security exception], the applicant shall have the burden of 
                                                                                                     
jurisdiction to review discretionary findings regarding 
timeliness.  See Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 
634 (3d Cir. 2006).  Because the BIA has already decided 
the issue, remand for this reason would likely be futile.   
 
11
 As explained in Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 202-03, the 
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 
107, amended existing law on withholding of removal to 
conform it to Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (―1967 Protocol‖).  
Article 33.1 of the 1967 Protocol, to which the United 
States is party, expresses the principle of nonrefoulement 
that ―[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return 
(‗refouler‘) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of [the protected grounds].‖  
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proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds 
do not apply.‖  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2).  The national 
security exception, however, does not preclude grant of 
temporary deferral of removal under the CAT if there is a 
likelihood of torture.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a).       
  
This court recognizes that withholding of removal 
provides greater protection and freedom than deferral of 
removal.  Indeed, deferral is a more easily revocable form of 
relief, which would leave Petitioners vulnerable.  See 
Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 240 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008).  
The Government can also invoke an adverse security 
determination to detain Petitioners indefinitely and place 
them on restrictive supervised release.
12
  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(3)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.14.  Although withholding 
like deferral does not provide the basis for adjustment to legal 
permanent resident status, deferral recipients who are found 
to be a danger to national security are considered inadmissible 
or deportable, which makes them per se ―ineligible to receive 
visas . . . to the United States.‖  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5).  In 
contrast, if granted withholding Petitioners would have no per 
se bars to adjustment of status, and would thus be able to 
obtain permanent residency through marriage, work, or 
family.   
 
Under the statutory scheme, the question whether an 
alien is a danger to the United States arises only once the IJ or 
BIA has found the alien is likely to be persecuted or tortured 
if removed to the country of nationality.  Absent such a 
finding, the alien would be removed without consideration of 
his or her danger to the United States.  However, both 
Immigration Judges and the BIA agreed that Yusupov and 
Samadov are likely to be tortured if removed.  Thus, 
notwithstanding Congress‘ determination that restrictions on 
                                              
12
 During the course of these proceedings, Petitioners 
spent three years in immigration detention.  Although 
Petitioners have since been released, the immigration 
service ―continues to subject them to strict curfews, travel 
restrictions and twenty-four hour electronic monitoring.‖  
Petitioners‘ 28(j) Letter dated Dec. 28, 2010.   
16 
 
removal are warranted if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe an alien poses a danger to national security, courts 
must strictly interpret exceptions to nonrefoulement precisely 
because they are applied to those determined to be deserving 
of protection.  See Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 203-04 (In enacting 
the 1980 Refugee Act, ―Congress intended to protect refugees 
to the fullest extent of our Nation‘s international obligations.  
Indeed . . . Congress intended to allow exceptions to our 
nonrefoulement obligations only in a narrow set of 
circumstances.‖); see also Xu Sheng Gao v. Att’y Gen., 500 
F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (narrowly interpreting bar to 
withholding because it would authorize deportation of 
individuals who have established that they would likely be 
persecuted if returned).      
 
B.  BIA Standard of Review 
 
 Petitioners argue that the BIA misapplied its standard 
of review and failed to properly credit the IJ‘s findings of 
fact.  In 2002, the Attorney General issued procedural reforms 
clarifying the BIA‘s scope of review.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(d)(3).
13
  Where the BIA reviews ―a mixed question of 
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 Section 1003.1(d)(3) provides:  
 
(i) The Board will not engage in de novo 
review of findings of fact determined by an 
immigration judge. Facts determined by the 
immigration judge, including findings as to 
the credibility of testimony, shall be 
reviewed only to determine whether the 
findings of the immigration judge are 
clearly erroneous.  
(ii) The Board may review questions of 
law, discretion, and judgment and all other 
issues in appeals from decisions of 
immigration judges de novo. . . . 
(iv) Except for taking administrative 
notice of commonly known facts such as 
current events or the contents of official 
documents, the Board will not engage in 
17 
 
law and fact . . . now referred to as a discretionary decision,‖ 
it should ―defer to the factual findings of the immigration 
judge unless clearly erroneous,‖ but it retains ―independent 
judgment and discretion, subject to the applicable governing 
standards, regarding the review of pure questions of law and 
the application of the standard of law to those facts.‖  Board 
of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve 
Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,888-89 (Aug. 26, 
2002) (internal quotation omitted).   
 
As such, when evaluating an immigration judge‘s 
determination whether there are reasonable grounds to believe 
an alien is a danger to the United States, the underlying 
circumstances – e.g. whether Yusupov watched the videos 
and why or whether he attended English classes – are factual 
questions subject to clear error review by the BIA.  On the 
other hand, when the BIA determines whether those facts 
give rise to a reasonable belief that an alien is a danger to 
national security it has before it a mixed question of law and 
fact that requires its application of a legal standard to facts as 
to which it retains ―independent judgment and discretion.‖14  
                                                                                                     
factfinding in the course of deciding 
appeals. 
 
14
 Yusupov argues that whether there are reasonable 
grounds to believe he is a danger is a question of fact akin 
to a likelihood determination, or a prediction of future 
events, subject to clear error review, not de novo.  
Yusupov misplaces reliance on two recent opinions of this 
court.  See Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 269-71 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (under CAT, probability of future torture is 
finding of fact subject to clear error review, but whether 
future events rise to level of torture is a legal question 
reviewed de novo); Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 
383, 387 (3d Cir. 2010) (extending Kaplun to asylum 
context, forecasting of what might happen to an applicant 
if returned is a factual question subject to clear error 
review, but whether events rise to the level of persecution 
and give rise to a well-founded fear are reviewed de 
novo).  Kaplun and Huang are inapposite except to the 
18 
 
This follows our previous holding that whether there are 
reasonable grounds to believe an applicant is a danger is akin 
to a probable cause determination that requires a finding that 
an applicant ―is‖ an actual and present danger.  Yusupov I, 
518 F.3d at 200-01.  Probable cause determinations are 
reviewed de novo.  See Harshbarger v. Regan, 599 F.3d 290, 
292 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010).     
 
Although the BIA stated that it left the IJ‘s positive 
credibility determination undisturbed and accepted Yusupov‘s 
innocent explanations as true, we review the BIA‘s actions 
rather than its statements.  We agree with Yusupov that 
notwithstanding the BIA‘s own regulation that states the 
―Board will not engage in de novo review of findings of fact 
determined by an immigration judge,‖ see 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(d)(3), the BIA did not follow its own standard.  For 
example, the IJ found credible Yusupov‘s testimony that he 
watched the videos out of a general interest in his country and 
the conflicts in the area and that he believed the extremist 
views of Osama bin Laden were inconsistent with true 
Islamic beliefs.  The IJ also found credible Yusupov‘s 
testimony that he quit his job and evaded the authorities 
because he feared deportation; when it became clear that his 
friends with similar fears were not deported immediately and 
were provided with an opportunity to present their claims, he 
came out of hiding.  Further, the IJ found credible Yusupov‘s 
explanation that he did not provide his residential address to 
investigators because he did not want to cause trouble for his 
host in Virginia, not because he attempted to hide anything 
suspicious.  However, when the BIA concluded that the 
presence of the videos and Yusupov‘s alleged evasion 
provided reasonable grounds to believe he is a danger, it did 
not appropriately defer to the IJ on these points. 
In contrast, the BIA did not err in relying on 
established facts not taken into account by the IJ regarding 
Yusupov‘s manner of entry to the United States and his 
misdemeanor conviction.  Under the standard for mixed 
questions of law and fact, the BIA was entitled to ―weigh the 
                                                                                                     
extent they illustrate that questions under the INA often 
involve multiple inquiries subject to varying review.   
19 
 
evidence in a manner different from that accorded by the 
[IJ].‖  Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 493, 497 (BIA 2008); 
see also Rotinsulu v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 
2008) (finding that the regulations were ―not intended to 
restrict the BIA‘s powers of review, including its power to 
weigh and evaluate evidence introduced before the IJ‖).  
Whether this court finds that substantial evidence supports the 
BIA‘s ultimate conclusion that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe Petitioners are a danger is a separate inquiry to 
which we now turn.  
 
C.  The Existence of Substantial Evidence  
 
The Government urges this court to defer to the BIA‘s 
finding that there are reasonable grounds to regard Petitioners 
as a danger to the security of the United States.  The 
Government focuses on the Executive‘s power and expertise 
in the area of national security, and relies on recent Supreme 
Court precedent to support its position.  In Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that ―when it comes to collecting evidence and 
drawing factual inferences in [the area of national security 
and foreign relations], the lack of competence on the part of 
the courts is marked, and respect for the Government‘s 
conclusions is appropriate.‖  130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted).   
 
We do not arrogate to ourselves knowledge and 
sources superior to that of the Government.  But neither 
should we take its statements as ipse dixit.  Its statements, like 
that of any party, must be supported by the record it makes.   
 
In HLP, the Government substantiated its position 
regarding the operation of terrorist networks through 
Congressional history, factual documentation, expert 
testimony, and an affidavit from the United States 
Department of State.
15
  On the contrary, this court has little to 
                                              
15
 In HLP, the plaintiffs argued that the criminal 
material support statute impermissibly regulated their 
speech because their support of designated foreign 
20 
 
which to defer in this case.  Neither the BIA nor the 
Government has provided the name of any potential terrorist 
organization or extremist movement with which they claim 
Petitioners are affiliated nor did either provide a ―coherent 
and reliable narrative‖ connecting Petitioners‘ seemingly 
innocuous actions and circumstances with any particular harm 
that Petitioners pose to the United States.  Malkandi v. 
Holder, 576 F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir. 2009).  Without some 
hard information, this court is left guessing.  It is significant 
that even the State Department has declined to offer any 
opinion about the dangerousness of the Petitioners.   
 
During the course of these proceedings, the State 
Department issued letters to the immigration court concerning 
Petitioners‘ applications.  The Department explained that 
issuance of the extradition requests is consistent with the 
Uzbek Government‘s practice of using broad provisions in its 
Criminal Code against political opponents for non-terrorism-
related activities.  The Department declined to offer a position 
with respect to Petitioners‘ applications, stating it ―has no 
evidence connecting [Yusupov or Samadov] to acts of 
terrorism.  The information available does not allow the 
Department to make a judgment as to whether [Petitioners] 
otherwise present[] a threat to the national security of the 
United States.‖  Y.Br.App. at 45, S.App. at 2170.  As the 
Supreme Court stated in HLP, ―concerns of national security 
and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial 
role.‖  130 S. Ct. at 2727.     
On remand, this court clearly instructed the BIA to 
ascertain whether reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence in the whole record reveals ―reasonable grounds to 
believe‖ Petitioners ―actually pose a danger‖ to the United 
                                                                                                     
terrorist organizations affiliated with the Tamil struggle 
for independence in Sri Lanka would not further the 
terrorist activities of the organizations.  The Government 
countered that terrorist organizations do not meaningfully 
segregate support for their legitimate activities from the 
nefarious.  Id. at 2722-24.  We have no reason to disagree 
with the Government.  
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States – ―a more certain determination‖ than whether they 
may or could be.  Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 201-02.  The BIA 
failed to follow this court‘s mandate when it issued 
substantially similar opinions pre- and post-remand.  We 
recognize that the BIA ―is not required to write an exegesis 
on every contention;‖ however, it must ―consider the issues 
raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable 
a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought 
and not merely reacted.‖  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 
256 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).  A formulaic 
recitation of our instructions simply does not suffice.  See Dia 
v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 250 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(―[T]he soundness of the basis of the decision-making, even if 
experiential or logical in nature, must be apparent.‖). 
 
The closest the BIA comes to identifying a particular 
threat posed by Petitioners involves their alleged support of 
Muslim extremists, to wit terrorists, in Uzbekistan based on 
the politically motivated Uzbek extradition requests and 
Interpol warrants.
16
  See In re Yusupov, No. A 79-729-905, at 
3-4 (BIA Dec. June 18, 2009) (the evidence ―shows a fair 
probability that [Yusupov] supports and assists terrorist 
activity‖); In re Samadov, No. A 79-729-711, at 4 (BIA Dec. 
June 18, 2009) (the Government met its burden of 
                                              
16
 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), there are two 
ways to determine whether an alien is ineligible for 
withholding as a threat to national security.  First, the 
agency may find the alien has been involved in terrorist 
activities or is a member of or associated with a terrorist 
organization as described 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B), which 
automatically renders the alien a danger.  Second, the 
agency may simply find that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe the individual is a danger to national security 
(i.e. defense, foreign relations, or economic interests).  
There is little guidance in the statute or subsequent 
interpretations as to the circumstances, other than 
involvement in terrorist activity or membership, that 
would render the alien a danger.  Indeed, it appears that 
the BIA rested its conclusions on a terrorism theory even 
though the Government did not charge Petitioners as such. 
22 
 
establishing reasonable grounds that Samadov is a security 
danger ―by supporting or assisting terrorism inspired by 
Muslim extremists‖).   
 
It appears that the principal basis for the BIA‘s finding 
that Petitioners are a danger to the United States stems from 
the extradition requests and Interpol warrants issued by the 
Uzbek Government.  Yet the BIA could not find that both IJs 
were clearly erroneous in their findings that the extradition 
requests and Interpol warrants were politically motivated and 
based on Petitioners‘ peaceful, religious beliefs.  Even giving 
full deference to the BIA, we conclude that there is no 
credible evidence in the record to support the BIA‘s 
conclusion.  On the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence 
that Article 244 of the Uzbek Criminal Code, upon which the 
Uzbekistan charges are based, is used by that government as a 
pretext to single out and punish those in peaceful opposition 
to the authoritarian regime.  Y.Br.App. at 45, S.App. at 2110 
(letter from State Department referring, inter alia, to Uzbek 
Government‘s practice of using ―broad provisions in [its] 
Criminal Code . . . against its political opponents‖ for non-
terrorism-related activities).   
 
Olexa (who testified on behalf of the Government at 
Petitioners‘ removal hearings, emphasized the extradition 
requests and the Interpol warrants in support of a finding that 
Petitioners were dangerous) apparently had no direct 
knowledge about the situation in Uzbekistan, and offered no 
information as to Petitioners‘ role in any alleged terrorist 
activity in Uzbekistan.
17
  It would lead to a perverse outcome 
                                              
17
 The Senior Researcher on Central Asia for Human 
Rights Watch, Acacia Shields, testified at Samadov‘s 
hearing before the IJ that she does not know of ―any 
Muslim groups [who favor the overthrow of the 
government] in the territory of Uzbekistan.‖  S.App. at 
2374.  She testified that the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (―IMU‖) ―was based in Afghanistan,‖ and did 
engage in acts of violence, but she had not seen ―any 
evidence‖ that the group still exists.  Id.  The IMU is on 
the current list of foreign terrorist organizations 
23 
 
were we to allow reliance on the fundamentally questionable 
extradition requests and Interpol warrants.  How can the BIA 
on one hand assert that the Uzbekistan charges are pretextual 
and provide grounds for the United States to protect 
Petitioners under the CAT while at the same time credit the 
very same allegations to find Petitioners are a danger to this 
country?  The BIA‘s reliance on these documents is even 
more problematic because, as we noted in Yusupov I, the 
information therein was apparently obtained by torture.  See 
Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 191-92 n.9; see also Boumediene v. 
Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (―Testimony 
procured by coercion is notoriously unreliable and 
unspeakably inhumane.‖); Abdah v. Obama, 709 F. Supp. 2d 
25, 28 n.3 (D.D.C. 2010) (―statements that are the product of 
torture are unreliable‖); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 
265, 280 (1961) (in a criminal case, ―the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or 
as a consequence of lawless official acts‖) (internal quotation 
omitted).  It follows that the documents relied on by the BIA 
are not probative as a matter of law.     
 
Even if there were some basis for the charges in the 
extradition request, ―[t]errorist activity that is directed at 
another country does not invariably or necessarily involve a 
danger to the security of the United States.‖  Hosseini v. 
Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2006).  See also 
Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848, 858 (9th Cir. 2004) (―it 
does not follow that an organization that might be a danger to 
one nation is necessarily a danger to the security of the United 
States‖).  The relevant statute and regulations adopted by the 
United States are based on an underlying assumption that 
aliens frequently seek protection from their own countries 
that regard them to be dangerous, usually because of their 
opposition to the government in power.  If we were to allow 
                                                                                                     
designated as such by the United States under INA § 219.  
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Dept. of State (Nov. 
24, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/ 
123085.htm.  It is undisputed that Petitioners have no 
affiliation with the IMU. 
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the BIA‘s decisions to stand, it would run counter to this 
country‘s strong tradition of granting protection to individuals 
sought by authoritarian regimes based on politically 
motivated charges.
18
  
 
The additional bases given by the BIA for its finding 
that Petitioners are dangerous is based on evidence that is 
impermissibly speculative.  Samadov argues persuasively that 
the legal standard requiring ―reasonable grounds to believe‖ 
Petitioners are dangerous cannot be met without presentation 
of evidence satisfying probable cause.  Guilt by association 
does not suffice.  See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 
224 (1961) (―In our jurisprudence guilt is personal . . . .‖); 
United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 277 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(probable cause ―must be . . . particularized with respect to 
that person‖) (internal quotation omitted).     
 
Part of the BIA‘s rationale for its conclusion that 
Petitioners pose a danger to the United States lies in their 
association with, inter alia, Zakirov.  Samadov argues that the 
BIA‘s rationale of guilt by association presents serious due 
process concerns which we must avoid.  He states that we can 
do so by imposing a ―firm substantive requirement limiting 
the application of the national security exception to cases in 
which sufficient probative evidence establishes that an 
individual is engaged in actual dangerous conduct, or 
otherwise meaningfully associated with avowedly dangerous 
organizations or countries.‖19  Samadov‘s Br. at 39-40.  As 
                                              
18
  There is extensive evidence in the record on the 
nature of the Uzbek regime.  According to Human Rights 
Watch testimony before the House of Representatives 
Committee on International Relations, ―Uzbekistan cannot 
be a good ally for the United States in the struggle against 
terrorism unless it stops persecuting Muslims for the 
peaceful expression of their faith.‖  S.App. at 3171-72. 
 
 
19
 The Fifth Amendment entitles non-citizens to due 
process of law in, inter alia, deportation proceedings.  
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). 
25 
 
Samadov points out, this limiting principle finds its roots in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence requiring conduct or 
meaningful association in the application of immigration 
statutes to suspected Communist Party members in the middle 
of the last century.  See, e.g., Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 
374 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1963) (holding mere membership in 
Communist Party was insufficient to meet threshold 
requirement of ―meaningful association‖ required for 
deportation); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957) 
(reversing BIA deportation order because active, dues-paying 
Community Party member who worked at ―an official outlet 
for communist literature‖ did not constitute meaningful 
association to warrant deportation); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 
U.S. 135, 145-46 (1945) (―course of conduct which reveals 
cooperation with Communist groups for the attainment of 
wholly lawful objectives‖ does not constitute ―affiliation‖ as 
defined by INA).   
 
This reading is also consistent with contemporary 
cases applying the national security exception that stand in 
sharp contrast to the instant case.
20
  In Malkandi v. Holder, 
576 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2009), for example, the Ninth Circuit 
found that substantial evidence supported the BIA‘s finding 
that an Iraqi Kurd is a danger to national security.  There, the 
court found that Malkandi served as a ―travel facilitator‖ for a 
notorious al-Qaeda operative who was involved in attacks 
against United States interests overseas.  Id. at 908.  As the 
court stated, the facts found by the BIA ―connect[ed] the 
dots‖ between a known terrorist from the Middle East, a 
Yemeni go between, and Malkandi.  Id. at 915.  The plot was 
substantiated by the Government‘s expert witness as well as 
specific 9/11 Commission findings and FBI interrogations of 
                                                                                                     
 
20
 Courts have even rejected the Government‘s 
authority to detain ―enemy combatants‖ at Guantanamo 
Bay based on mere speculation or guilt by association.  
See, e.g., Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 
82 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting charge as speculative); Ahmed 
v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 65 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(rejecting charge as associational).   
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the operative.  Id. at 910-11, 915.  Moreover, the court found 
altogether implausible Malkandi‘s innocent explanations for 
the charged conduct.  It found that his pattern of 
misrepresentations with the immigration authorities under 
oath ―discredited his portrayal of himself as an innocent 
participant.‖  Id. at 917.  Cf. Matter of U-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
355, 356 (BIA 2002) (finding reasonable grounds to believe 
Iranian national is a danger to national security because he is 
a member of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (―MEK‖), a designated 
foreign terrorist organization under INA § 219).   
 
In contrast to its holding in Malkandi, in Cheema the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA‘s finding of dangerousness in 
part because ―no evidence supplies a link‖ between the 
applicants‘ alleged donations and ―any specific organization, 
let alone . . . militant organizations.‖  383 F.3d at 856.  Cf. 
Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 628 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(reversing BIA‘s order where government failed to establish 
individual engaged in violent acts or that he knew or 
reasonably should have known of terrorist organization‘s 
activities).  
 
The INA also contains a related bar to the grant of 
asylum and withholding to individuals who have persecuted 
others on account of one of the protected grounds.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i).  As the Second Circuit noted, 
―courts must be cautious before permitting generalities or 
attenuated links‖ when applying the bar for persecution of 
others because the aliens have established that they will likely 
be persecuted upon return to their country.  Xu Sheng Gao, 
500 F.3d at 98.  See also Diaz-Zanatta v. Holder 558 F.3d 
450, 455 (6th Cir. 2009) (―the alien must have done more 
than simply associate with persecutors; there must have been 
some nexus between the alien‘s actions and the persecution of 
others‖); Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 
2005) (requiring a showing of ―genuine assistance in 
persecution‖ rather than an ―inconsequential association‖).  
The same concerns motivate our decision here.   
  
The record does not provide substantial, if any, 
evidence that Petitioners engaged in conduct that was 
27 
 
dangerous, or were planning as much, or meaningfully 
associated with organizations or countries inimical to the 
United States, terrorist or otherwise.  Although a probable 
cause requirement does not require more probable than not 
proof, it does require more than mere suspicion.  It is 
established when ―the facts and circumstances within the 
[Government‘s] knowledge are sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has 
been or is being committed by [Petitioners].‖  Reedy v. 
Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 211 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 
omitted).  In analyzing whether probable cause exists, we take 
a totality of the circumstances approach.  Id.  We therefore 
proceed to consider each remaining ground given by the BIA.  
 
Computer Materials: The BIA accorded evidentiary 
significance to videos on the computer shared by the 
occupants of Petitioners‘ apartment and to an email sent, not 
to either Petitioner, but to someone else living in the 
apartment.  These materials either viewed individually or with 
the record as a whole do not meet the probable cause 
standard.
21
  With respect to the videos, the BIA made 
significant prejudicial errors regarding the contents.
22
  The 
record does not support the BIA‘s contention that Ayman za-
Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden‘s deputy, appeared in any of the 
videos much less that he was giving a ―speech.‖  The BIA 
also characterizes the video of Chechen rebel leader Shamil 
Basayev as a ―speech,‖ whereas the record refers to it as an 
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 Petitioners testified that they never saw the 
Pennsylvania Police facilities map and the Government 
presents no evidence to the contrary.  Even if they had 
viewed it, the BIA has provided no explanation for how 
this publicly available map in any way demonstrates 
Petitioners are a danger.  This court can only presume that 
is because there is none. 
 
22
 Because Olexa, the Government‘s expert, does not 
speak the language contained in the videos, he was unable 
to provide detailed descriptions of what was said, and 
there was no translation provided.   
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―interview.‖  Y.App. at 364, S.App. at 1949.  Further, the 
BIA described one clip as ―appear[ing] to show how to wire a 
roadside bomb.‖  In re Samadov, No. A 79-729-711, at 2 
(BIA Dec. June 18, 2009).  However, Agent Olexa 
specifically testified that none of the videos were ―training 
materials.‖  Y.App. at 191.  Moreover, contrary to the BIA‘s 
finding, several of the videos, including that of bin Laden, 
originated from Al Jazeera, a recognized news source.
23
   
 
As discussed above, the BIA also failed to 
acknowledge that the IJ presiding over Yusupov‘s hearing 
found credible Yusupov‘s innocent explanations.  To now 
find Yusupov‘s innocent explanations not credible, the BIA 
must point to evidence in the record that compels the 
conclusion that the IJ erred.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) 
(―Facts determined by the immigration judge, including 
findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed 
only to determine whether the findings of the immigration 
judge are clearly erroneous.‖).  It has not done so.  The IJ 
found that Yusupov understandably had a general interest in 
the activities occurring in his home country in the name of his 
religion and that he rejected the views espoused on the 
videos, as opposed to his own beliefs and understanding of 
Islam.  Indeed, millions worldwide were glued to their 
television sets and computers in the wake of 9/11 in an 
attempt to understand the tragic events.  The BIA has 
provided no plausible link between the act of watching these 
videos and any risk to this Nation‘s defense, foreign relations 
                                              
23
 Yusupov testified that some of the videos came from 
the website, kavkazcenter.com.  Y.App. at 206.  Neither 
party presented evidence about the nature of this website 
yet the BIA characterizes it as ―pro-extremist.‖  In re 
Yusupov, No. A 79-729-905, at 3 (BIA Dec. June 18, 
2009).  This court takes judicial notice of the website that 
describes itself as ―a Chechen internet agency which is 
independent, international and Islamic . . . . registered 
with the CRI Ministry of Justice.‖   About Kavkaz Center, 
Kavkaz Center, http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/about/ (last 
visited May 19, 2011).   
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or economic interests.
24
  This court also finds significant the 
IJ‘s finding, ignored by the BIA, that Yusupov did not intend 
to permanently download or archive the videos in any way.     
 
Reliance on the videos to support a finding of 
Samadov‘s dangerousness is even more specious.  A ―mere 
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal 
activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause.‖  
Shields, 458 F.3d at 277 (internal quotation omitted).  The 
BIA impermissibly shifted the burden on the required 
showing with respect to national security to Samadov when it 
required that he corroborate his assertions that no evidence 
connected him to the activities of his roommate, Yusupov.
25
  
See Malkandi, 576 F.3d at 915 (noting that the burden only 
shifts to the alien to prove he is not a danger to national 
security once the Government has provided substantial 
evidence that he is).  Even if Samadov happened to be present 
when Yusupov was watching the videos, inadvertent viewing 
does not constitute evidence of affirmative, nefarious activity.  
Cf. Shields, 458 F.3d at 279 (active registration with e-groups 
dedicated to trading child porn negated inference that 
defendant stumbled upon the sites never to return).  
 
                                              
24
 As IJ Durling noted, the situation in Chechnya 
referred to in some of the videos ―is quite complex and 
selected depictions from computer video files is woefully 
inadequate to form even a basic understanding of that 
long-simmering conflict.‖  In re Yusupov, No. A79-729-
905, at 7 n.11 (IJ Dec. Nov. 19, 2004). 
 
25
 At oral argument, the Government argued that 
Yusupov‘s testimony demonstrates that Samadov watched 
the videos.  However, Yusupov‘s testimony was not 
presented to the immigration court in Samadov‘s case.  In 
any event, this testimony is hardly affirmative evidence 
that Samadov, lumped together with the ―whole world,‖ 
watched any videos, let alone the specific videos in 
question.  Y.App. at 209-10.   
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The Government did not present evidence that either 
Petitioner ever saw the email referring to ―jihad‖ on the 
computer.  Moreover, the email is vague, see supra note 4, 
and the BIA, relying on stereotype and speculation failed to 
consider alternative meanings presented by Petitioners.  In 
Yusupov I, we instructed the BIA on remand to consider the 
weight of Petitioners‘ evidence that there are alternative 
meanings to the word ―jihad.‖  In addition to violent holy 
war, which is the commonly used meaning of jihad, other 
meanings proffered on the record include ―from an inward 
spiritual struggle to attain perfect faith to an outward material 
struggle to promote justice and the Islamic social system.‖  
Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 191 n.7 (internal quotation omitted).  
Petitioners‘ consistent testimony, corroborated by country 
conditions evidence, was that they identify as Independent 
Muslims who follow a peaceful practice.   
 
In short, ―in spite of the number of years‖ Petitioners 
have been present in this country, their computer ―did not 
produce any direct or causal link suggesting that [they] 
espoused violence, such as email messages of a questionable 
nature.‖  In re Yusupov, No. A 79-729-905, at 6 (IJ Dec. Nov. 
19, 2004).   
 
Manner of Entry:  Once again, we are unanimous that 
the BIA‘s finding that Petitioners‘ manner of entry supports a 
finding of dangerousness is not supported by substantial 
evidence.  Samadov entered on a student visa with Zakirov 
and attended a four week program.
26
  Yusupov also entered 
on a student visa several months later but unlike his former 
roommates, never attended school.  Y.App. at 109-10.  
Petitioners testified that they did not follow through with their 
                                              
26
 The Government asserts that Samadov only attended 
two weeks of school in contrast to Samadov‘s testimony 
that he attended four weeks of school, as originally 
planned, and then stopped for financial reasons and 
thereafter sought work.  S.App. at 2297.  The IJ stated that 
Samadov and Zakirov ―spent four weeks studying English 
as a second language.‖  S.App. at 2215. 
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education for financial reasons.  Y.App. at 109-10, 129, 
S.App. at 2297.  This explanation is not inherently suspect 
and cannot substitute for affirmative evidence of 
dangerousness.
27
  See Hosseini, 471 F.3d at 958 (reversing 
denial of withholding of petitioner who overstayed student 
visa, because BIA ―made no finding, and cited no evidence, 
of any reason other than terrorist activity [abroad] why 
Hosseini is a danger to the security of the United States‖).   
 
The Government makes passing reference in its briefs 
to its suspicion based on the timing of Petitioners‘ entries to 
the United States as just after a bombing in Uzbekistan in 
1999.  However, it makes no attempt to ―connect[ ] the dots‖ 
between this event and any actual evidence implicating 
Petitioners.  Malkandi, 576 F.3d at 915.  Petitioners have 
submitted evidence that the Uzbek Government itself was 
implicated in the 1999 bombings and used the events to crack 
down on opponents of its regime.  Y.App. at 788, S.App. at 
930.
28
     
 
Alleged evasion of the authorities:  The BIA‘s finding 
that Yusupov and Zakirov sought to evade detection by the 
authorities in the United States through interstate and 
international flight mischaracterizes the record and fails to 
acknowledge the plausible explanations provided by 
                                              
27
 The Government directs us to the Congressional 
reports of the 9/11 Commission to support its contention 
that the manner of entry is suspect.  Yet, the Government 
admits that this report does not establish any facts 
pertaining to Petitioners in particular.  See Appellee‘s Br. 
in Yusupov v. Att’y Gen. at 41; Appellee‘s Br. in Samadov 
v. Att’y Gen. at 53.  We cannot draw conclusions 
regarding Petitioners from this report. 
 
28
  We recognize that some of the Government‘s 
suspicions may stem from the fact that some of the aliens 
responsible for the 9/11 bombings entered this country on 
student visas, but we know of no basis to attribute the 
same terroristic intent to all foreign student visa holders. 
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Petitioners.  Although Zakirov left the United States before 
the Government had a chance to file a motion to reopen with 
the new evidence found on the roommates‘ shared computer, 
there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Government 
or the BIA has attempted to rescind the grant of withholding 
of removal.  See In re Zakirov, No. A 79-729-712 (BIA Dec. 
Sept. 21, 2004).  Petitioners contend that Zakirov traveled 
openly to Canada after being granted withholding of removal 
and the Government presents no evidence in contradiction.  
Indeed, at that time, nothing prevented Zakirov from seeking 
asylum, a more permanent form of relief, in Canada after his 
proceedings in the United States were final.
29
  In any event, 
the BIA does not explain why it paints Petitioners with 
Zakirov‘s brush. 
 
Yusupov testified that he moved to Virginia after 
being granted withholding of removal, not in an attempt to 
evade the authorities.  However, after he learned that the 
Government reopened Samadov‘s case and incarcerated him, 
Yusupov quit his job to avoid detection because he feared 
deportation to Uzbekistan where he believed he would be 
tortured.  Y.App. at 149.  As soon as Yusupov learned that 
the Government was not going to deport his friends, he 
returned to his Virginia job and cooperated with subsequent 
investigations.  Y.App. at 150.  The BIA has not explained 
why it did not take this alternate, credible explanation into 
account.  See Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 425 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (unexplained decision not supported by substantial 
evidence where contrary to testimony).  
                                              
29
 A subsequent agreement between the United States 
and Canada prevents Canada from adjudicating an 
application for asylum already decided upon in the United 
States and vice versa.  However, this rule would not apply 
to Zakirov who appears to have entered Canada prior to 
December 29, 2004 when the agreement became effective.  
See Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of Canada for 
Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims 
from Nationals of Third Countries, U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 
2002, Can. T.S. No. 2. 
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There is no evidence that Samadov sought to evade 
detection.  Any purportedly suspicious activities undertaken 
by Samadov‘s friends are, as a matter of law, insufficient to 
establish individualized suspicion against him.  This is 
particularly applicable here, as the three individuals were no 
longer living together.  The Government speculates that 
Samadov did not flee because ―it would have been more 
difficult for him to do so—and perhaps in his mind, less 
necessary—because he had married an American citizen.‖  
Appellee‘s Br. at 51 n.19.  No evidence supports this 
speculation.  Moreover, ―where a factor and its opposite can 
both be used‖ to support a finding of reasonable suspicion, 
here flight or no flight, ―the court should not give weight to 
either factor.‖  Gonzalez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 22 F.3d 1441, 1446-
67 (9th Cir. 1994).      
 
Yusupov’s Misdemeanor Conviction:  The BIA has 
failed to explain how Yusupov‘s misdemeanor conviction for 
misrepresenting his nationality in an attempt to obtain 
employment provides any connection to his asserted 
dangerousness.
30
  The IJ in Yusupov‘s hearing and the BIA 
found Yusupov‘s testimony to be credible regarding the heart 
of his claims (the prior standard) and there is no evidence that 
claiming citizenship to obtain employment indicates he is a 
danger.  This is not unusual behavior, albeit undesirable and 
unlawful, for the tens of thousands of economic migrants and 
                                              
30
 The Government makes some attempt to connect his 
behavior seeking a job by claiming that instead of 
enrolling in language school, Yusupov earned money and 
sent it ―to the families of criminals in Uzbekistan.‖  
Appellee‘s Br. at 41.  This argument distorts the record – 
Yusupov testified that he sent the money to other 
Independent Muslims like himself targeted by the Uzbek 
authorities.  Because the BIA did not rely on it, it merits 
little, if any, weight.  
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refugees who enter our borders each year and does not here 
support a finding of probable cause.
31
 
 
Samadov’s adverse credibility determination:  The 
charge emphasized most vehemently by the BIA and the 
Government stems from the adverse credibility finding made 
by the IJ.  Samadov argues that finding is clearly erroneous, is 
not material to any of the Government‘s allegations that he is 
a danger and, even if upheld, cannot be used to undermine 
Samadov‘s other testimony.  It is, however, our responsibility 
to examine the record scrupulously in this connection.  
 
Like factual findings, ―adverse credibility 
determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence.‖  
Balasubramanrim v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1998).  
As such, ―adverse credibility determinations based on 
speculation or conjecture, rather than on evidence in the 
record, are reversible.‖  Dia, 353 F.3d at 249 (internal 
quotation omitted).   
 
Notably, at Samadov‘s first hearing, IJ Sease found his 
testimony regarding his activities in Uzbekistan and the origin 
of the extradition request to be ―extremely credible.‖  S.App. 
at 46.  In the reopened proceedings, the same IJ without 
recanting her earlier findings, found Samadov‘s account of 
some aspects of his life in Philadelphia to be not credible.  In 
re Samadov, No. A 79-729-711, at 9-10 (IJ Dec. Aug. 2, 
2005).  The IJ based her latest adverse credibility finding on 
the following: (1) Samadov did not know every guest who 
stayed at the communal home rented in his name in 
Philadelphia; (2) Samadov was not familiar with everything 
stored on the computer he shared with his roommates; and (3) 
                                              
31
 This court also finds significant that in January 
2007, a district court in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania found that special circumstances (e.g. 
adverse foreign policy consequences or anti-terrorism 
concerns) did not warrant Yusupov‘s continued detention.  
Yusupov v. Lowe, No. 4:06-CV-1804 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 
2007).  The Government did not even argue that special 
circumstances existed in that case. 
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Samadov did not mention that he wired $3,000 to his brother 
in Uzbekistan when he was initially questioned by the 
Government about money sent home.   
 
No record evidence supports the IJ‘s first contention 
that it was implausible that Samadov did not know everyone 
who was living in his house.  Samadov was never asked to 
provide the occupants‘ names and never testified that he 
lacked this knowledge.  Rather, Samadov testified to the 
transient nature of the house and testified that anywhere from 
six to eight men lived there at any given time.  The 
Government conceded at oral argument that this was a 
―peculiar finding‖ by the IJ that does not support the adverse 
credibility determination.  Tr. of Oral Arg. at 58.   
 
The IJ‘s second contention is based on pure conjecture 
and similarly cannot support a lack of credibility on the part 
of Samadov.  Dia, 353 F.3d at 249-50.  Samadov testified that 
he never saw the materials found on the computer and that he 
rarely used the computer because it was frequently in use by 
others in the house and he spent little time at home given his 
work schedule.  S.App. at 430.  As we previously noted, the 
Government presented no evidence to the contrary.  Indeed, 
as Samadov points out, the Government failed to inform the 
IJ that ―Yusupov had admitted that he was the one who found 
the videoclips on the internet, and that in the course of 
viewing they were cached – not downloaded, as the BIA 
claimed – on the computer without his knowledge.‖  
AALDEF Br. at 26.  We see no basis in the record for the IJ‘s 
finding that Samadov must have known about the cached 
videoclips.  That finding is impermissibly based on the IJ‘s 
assumption that Samadov would have been interested in the 
video contents because he is a Muslim.   
  
Finally, we examine the record for any support for the 
IJ‘s determination that Samadov‘s testimony concerning the 
wire transfer to his brother is suspect.  The Government 
argues that Samadov could not have honestly forgotten 
sending $3,000 to his brother five years prior to the hearing.  
Samadov counters that when he was first questioned about 
sending money to Uzbekistan, the questioning was focused on 
36 
 
charitable contributions
32
 and because he regarded the 
payment to his brother as a repayment of a debt obligation, he 
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 For example,  
 
 Q.  Sir, they say that you‘ve have 
sent money back to Uzbekistan to fellow 
followers of Iman Nazarov, have you not? 
 
 A. No. 
 
 Q. No?  Who have you sent money 
to (indiscernible)? 
 
 A. I sent to people there poor and 
needy people. 
 
 Q. And how did you learn the 
identities of the poor and needy   people who 
needed money? 
 
 A. How I? 
 
 Q. Yes, how did you know who to 
send the money to? 
 
 A. Because I give my friends with a 
person who‘s in charge of they give that 
person people.  They are responsible to give 
that charity to those people. 
 
 Q. How much money do you think 
you‘ve sent back to Uzbekistan since you‘ve 
been here in the United States? 
 
 A. Maybe $200. 
 
 Q. Two hundred dollars total? 
 
 A. Yes.  Yes. 
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 Q. That‘s your best recollection? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. In what sort of increments of 
money have you sent there? 
 
 A. I don‘t understand the question 
increments? 
 
 Q. You sent $200 once and that‘s it 
or did you send $10 one day, $10 another - -  
 
 A. Twenty dollars, thirty dollars, 
whenever I feel give charity when I hear 
about somebody needs because so many 
families back there their husbands, their 
fathers in jail, their wives don‘t work, their 
kids are starving. 
 
 Q. Well, who is communicating 
these needs to you? 
 
 A. We have Muslim brothers in my 
country. 
 
 Q. And how would they 
communicate to you about their need for 
money? 
 
 A. Well, they can my friends call, 
they call or when I call my brother I found 
out about it.  I send money for my relatives 
where ever I ask my brother this person is 
alright?  This neighbor is alright?  Because 
sometimes I call, my brother says, my mom 
says listen to my neighbors take in to 
custody, the kids are starving.  Then I say, 
I‘m not going to eat food here (indiscernible) 
38 
 
did not think it was relevant.  See AALDEF Br. at 28 (―many 
Muslims draw a stark distinction between the concepts of 
debt and charity‖).   
 
Samadov argues that a review of the transcript makes 
clear that he did not intend to mislead the factfinder.  When 
Samadov sought to explain his testimony, the IJ denied him 
the opportunity to clarify his responses.  S.App. at 440-41.  
See Caushi v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Campos-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 
1999) (requiring the BIA to consider applicant‘s explanations 
for inconsistencies before making a credibility 
determination)); Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 
2007) (IJ must ―provide a petitioner with a reasonable 
opportunity to offer an explanation of any perceived 
inconsistencies that form the basis of a denial of‖ relief) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
  
The Government‘s argument that Samadov only 
admitted to transferring money to his brother because the 
Government confronted him is belied by the record.
33
  
                                                                                                     
they are starving there.  And that‘s what my 
religion teached me. 
 
 Q. And you‘re sure that it wouldn‘t 
be more than $200 (indiscernible)? 
 
 A. Yes, yes, sure. 
 
S.App. at 425-426. 
 
  
33
  An examination of the testimony bears this out.  
After a break of a few weeks, the hearing resumed and the 
Government lawyer focused on what he regarded as the 
inconsistency in Samadov‘s testimony, stating: 
 
    And now we have bank records that 
show, that in fact, in June of 2000 he wired 
a substantial sum of money, apparently to 
39 
 
                                                                                                     
his brother.  Some $3,000 and Mr. Arlow 
gave a copy to me before the hearing.  I 
don‘t know whether he‘s intending to 
submit it into evidence, I believe he just 
received it yesterday, that is a I believe is a 
handwritten fax from the respondent‘s 
brother confirming that he received $3,000 
in June of 2000 from his brother. 
 
S.App. at 447.  Samadov was then recalled: 
 
 JUDGE TO [SAMADOV‘S LAWYER] 
 
  Q. Mr. Arlow, you certainly have 
the right to question your client as well, but 
I believe that the Government has asked to 
recall you and I certainly want to know, 
want some explanations between what you 
previously said and the bank records that 
the Government has supplied. 
 
  A. May it please the court, we also 
agree that the money was transferred.  It‘s 
not just that they‘re bank records.  It‘s 
acknowledgement of receipt.  There‘s not a 
question that the money was transferred. 
 
  . . . 
 
[GOVERNMENT LAWYER] TO MR. 
SAMADOV   
 
  Q. Mr. Samadov, did you send 
approximately $3,000 U.S. dollars to 
someone in Uzbekistan about June 20
th
, 
2000? 
 
  A. Yes, I did send (indiscernible)  I 
send to my brother.  Like I said in my 
court, last previously court date, -- 
40 
 
                                                                                                     
 
JUDGE TO MR. SAMADOV 
 
  Q. The answer is yes or no, sir. 
 
MR. SAMADOV TO [GOVERNMENT 
LAWYER] 
   
  Q. Yes, to my brother, not to 
someone 
 
  A. Okay. 
 
  Q. And how did you do that? 
 
  A. Yes, I wired the money.  It was 
my (indiscernible) pay. 
 
  Q. And how did you wire the 
money? 
 
  A. My account. 
 
  . . .  
   
  Q. And, how long did it take you to 
save up that money? 
 
  A. A year and a half. 
 
  Q. Okay.  And this was as you said, 
your first priority was paying him back, 
right? 
 
  A. Yes. 
 
  Q. Because it had been a big 
hardship to him to help you out? 
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Samadov testified that he telephoned his brother to help him 
remember the amount of debt he repaid before the hearing.  
At the continued hearing, Samadov produced a letter from his 
                                                                                                     
  A. Exactly.  He had bankruptcy so I 
knew that – 
 
  Q. And you must‘ve felt good that 
you were paying him back and helping him 
out? 
 
  A. I‘m not helping out, it‘s just 
whatever my debt.  It‘s nothing extra. 
 
  Q. Right.  All right.  But you were 
glad that you were able to fulfill your debt. 
 
  A. Of course, you know, as a 
brother. 
 
  Q. Had you forgotten all of this last 
time we had a hearing here and I asked you 
whether you had ever wired any money to 
Uzbekistan? 
 
  A. Yes, because it was debt.  It was 
nothing extra.  That‘s why I can‘t see, as 
like I said, I want to make very clear.  In 
my previous court hearing, I said your 
question and the Judge also ask, did you, I 
said I don‘t remember.  Like you said, but 
if I did, I said I did send to my brother.  
You ask was it Isroil Samadov, I said who 
was that person.  I said Isroil Samadov.  If 
I (indiscernible) say I sent to my brother. 
You ask who was it.  It‘s on the record and 
I said Isroil Samadov.  I spell the name 
very clear. 
 
S.App. at 450-454. 
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brother, and on his own accord, provided an explanation for 
the discrepancy that arose in the prior hearing.  S.App. at 560.   
 
 Regardless, this discrepancy does not go to the heart of 
Samadov‘s claims and, as such, cannot support an adverse 
credibility determination.  Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 
323 (3d Cir. 2004).
34
  The Government presented no evidence 
and the IJ made no finding that this $3,000 supports a finding 
of danger by Samadov to the United States.  The IJ made no 
finding that the $3,000 went to finance terrorist or extremist 
activities, or that Samadov had any motive to lie or hide other 
transfers.
35
  See Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582, 590 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (―one adverse credibility determination does not 
beget another . . . an IJ must justify each credibility finding 
with statements or record evidence specifically related to the 
issue under consideration‖) (internal quotation omitted).  This 
is not surprising because, as the Government admitted at oral 
argument, ―[t]here is no direct evidence.‖  Tr. of Oral Arg. at 
67.  The only reliable evidence is a letter from Samadov‘s 
brother confirming that the money was sent to repay a debt.  
S.App. at 560.  Other than the $3,000, Samadov testified that 
he sent about $200 cash to needy families, testimony the 
Government does not dispute.  Cf. In re R-S-H-, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. 629, 641 (BIA 2003) (upholding adverse credibility 
finding where respondent‘s testimony was directly related to 
whether he was aware of the terrorist-linked activities of an 
organization, despite his role therein).   
                                              
34
 Because Samadov filed his asylum application 
before May 11, 2005, the pre-REAL ID Act standard 
applies.  Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 
2007).   
 
35
 The Government half-heartedly attempts to link this 
transfer of cash with potential support for bombings that 
occurred in Uzbekistan in 2004.  Appellee‘s Br. at 44 
n.15.  However, the $3,000 was wired to Samadov‘s 
brother in June 2000 and there is nothing in the record 
linking this cash or his brother to any such activities.  In 
fact, Samadov was in Government custody at the time of 
the bombing and in the months before.   
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The IJ also noted that she took into account Samadov‘s 
―demeanor, candor, [and] responsiveness.‖  In re Samadov, 
No. A 79-729-711, at 9 (IJ Dec. Aug. 2, 2005).  However, the 
IJ did not explain why these factors demonstrated that all of 
Samadov‘s testimony was incredible and the IJ‘s holding 
deserves no deference.
36
  See Dia, 353 F.3d at 252, 275 
(McKee, J., concurring) (―resting factual conclusions upon 
unexplained and unarticulated demeanor poses an even 
greater risk of biased fact finding that can deny a petitioner 
due process‖).  Accordingly, we find no evidence to support 
the IJ‘s finding, adopted by the BIA, that Samadov‘s 
testimony was not credible.     
 
Neither the IJ nor the BIA made any affirmative 
finding that the testimony it deemed incredible implicates 
national security.  Substantial evidence is required to link the 
associations and activities of Yusupov and Samadov with one 
of the criteria relating to the security of the United States.  
The Government, ―[w]ith the extensive resources of the 
Executive Branch, including the resources of the Departments 
of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury and others . . . is in a 
unique position to provide such evidence.‖  Cheema, 383 
F.3d at 857.  The Government has not so done.  The evidence 
viewed as a whole not only supports a conclusion contrary to 
the BIA, but compels it.  See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 
477, 484 (3d Cir. 2001).  
                                              
36
 The Government argues that ―Samadov was 
frequently uncooperative and belligerent, and had to 
repeatedly be instructed to answer the questions that were 
posed to him, and not be argumentative.‖  Appellee‘s Br. 
at 48.  The Government mischaracterizes the record and 
misinterprets what appears to be Samadov‘s confusion, 
not unexpected given frequent language and cultural 
barriers in immigration proceedings. 
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IV. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As we have set forth in some detail, we conclude that 
the BIA‘s determination that Petitioners Yusupov and 
Samadov present an actual and present danger to the United 
States is not supported by substantial evidence.  We are 
acutely cognizant that, in most respects, Congress has 
delegated issues of national security with respect to aliens to 
the agencies that deal with immigration, most particularly to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals.  We recognize that the 
BIA is in a position of knowledge superior to that of the 
federal courts.  Nonetheless, we retain our historic, indeed 
constitutional authority, to review executive agencies‘ 
determinations, giving their determinations due deference.  In 
that vein, we do not decide that Petitioners do not present a 
danger to this country‘s security; we merely decide that the 
Government has not proven that they are! 
 
Ordinarily, the ―proper course . . . is for an appellate 
court to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 
explanation.‖  Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 
2010) (internal quotation and brackets omitted).  However, in 
rare circumstances ―where application of the correct legal 
principles to the record could lead only to the same 
conclusion, there is no need to require agency 
reconsideration.‖  Id. (internal quotation and brackets 
omitted).  This is such a case.   
 
There is no dispute that Petitioners would be 
persecuted and tortured on religious and political grounds if 
returned to Uzbekistan.  No amount of reconsideration by the 
BIA will change that.  Where the BIA has twice considered 
the whole record and failed to support its conclusion that 
Petitioners are a danger to national security with substantial 
evidence, and where the Government represented at oral 
argument that there are no additional facts or evidence to link 
either individual to activities or groups adverse to United 
States interests, there is no reason to remand.  See, e.g., Zhu v. 
Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 602 (5th Cir. 2007) (―[T]he BIA has 
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now had two opportunities to address the legal and factual 
issues that are again before this court; we need not give it a 
third bite at this apple.‖).  
 
It follows that Yusupov and Samadov are entitled to 
mandatory withholding of removal as a matter of law.
37
  See 
I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 420 (1999).  ―When 
the outcome is clear as a matter of law . . . remand is not 
necessary.‖  Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 253 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  Accordingly, we grant the petitions for review 
and direct the BIA to grant Petitioners‘ applications for 
withholding of removal. 
                                              
37
 We deny Samadov‘s request that we overturn the 
agency‘s denial of asylum.  This court lacks jurisdiction to 
do so.  See supra note 10. 
